A Path For Europe
The Iran War poses a diplomatic dilemma. One solution is for Europeans to aid the Gulf states directly.
The conflict in Iran has been remarkable above all for one thing: almost nobody is willing to claim any agency in it. Not the Gulf states who have been attacked over something none of them did, not the global community reeling from the oil crisis they did not vote for. With the lone exception of Ukraine, who has once again bitten its tongue and sent help when it was needed, most countries are either hoping that the problem will go away, limiting their response to defensive measures only, or thinking that by making Donald Trump clean it up, he will learn a lesson.
On paper, all these actors want the same thing—the Strait of Hormuz open, the oil flowing, and the Iranian regime’s habit of shooting projectiles at unrelated parties brought to an end.
So why don’t they get involved?
For the Gulf states, any involvement with the U.S.– and Israeli-led attack on a fellow Muslim state means problems down the line as well as some loss of face. After all, some of these states are yet to sign an official peace agreement with Israel. At the same time, there are only so many missiles and drones one can afford to shoot down over one’s own oil fields and civilian populations without retaliating.
As for the usual U.S. allies… well, there aren’t really any left. After Trump tried to abscond with Greenland, threatened Canada, and all but sanctioned Europe, to say nothing of the wrecking ball he took to NATO or his curious faith in Putin’s peaceful intentions, the problem is not that nobody wants to deal with the United States. It’s that nobody can afford to deal with the United States—they know they will end up with a political bill for everything, and yet somehow will still be responsible for the failures. Plus, Trump will demand that they thank him for it.
Does Europe have to get involved?
If Europe does not participate in some form or other, and Trump achieves a result he can sell as success (spectacular or reasonable), Europe will be relegated to the table of irrelevances. This would only work well for Europe if their plan is to be irrelevant. Few would dispute that the current POTUS has a propensity for vindictiveness.
Meanwhile, if Trump fails, Europe will never hear the end of it. It will be designated as the party responsible for any and all failures, and as the ally that did not turn up. Europe will pay with higher tariffs, accelerated attempts to break up the EU, and American withdrawal from NATO commitments. And Ukraine will almost certainly be used as a showpiece—despite being the only one who turned up when the call went out for support.
Then again, it is almost certain that Trump will seek revenge even if he succeeds. So, Europe will pay the price whatever the outcome.
What’s more, as the two ballistic missiles fired at the island of Diego Garcia show, Iranian missiles have the potential to reach much further than the immediate vicinity in the Middle East. Some Gulf states were quietly minding their own business, and they were still attacked by Iran. Targeting Europe might be an easy decision for Iran to make. Europe might not have the luxury of waiting this one out.
Finally, although Europe is not at war at the moment, it is actively planning for such an eventuality. According to most estimates provided by European intelligence services, Russia could start a major war in Europe within just five years.
Considering this, it might be useful for Europe to weaken the adversary by weakening its allies. Recently, Russia lost Syria and Assad, Venezuela and Maduro. The loss of Iran and its mullahs might not just reduce its capabilities, but also lower Russia’s standing in the world.
Two approaches to the Middle East
But if Europe and its allies want to shape events according to their own needs, they would still have to overcome the problem of an unreliable Washington—including future administrations should the issue remain relevant for some time. We cannot really assume that the next administration will be substantially different—after all, roughly half of the U.S. population voted for the current one, and they haven’t gone anywhere.
The United States is not the only party with a dog in this fight. The Gulf states have one, too. Even if the Strait of Hormuz is unblocked while the Iranian regime stays, then they, their economies, and their infrastructure will continue to be sitting ducks whenever Iran wants to exercise its newly discovered leverage over the region. Being the only irrational actor in an otherwise sane neighbourhood can offer remarkable benefits, as shown by Russia—you get to keep what does not belong to you while everyone else hopes that you will not want even more of what does not belong to you.
Besides, the Gulf states are the only ones for whom Trump has a healthy dose of respect (we could add Russia, but that respect is decidedly unhealthy). If Europe offered its support directly to the affected Middle Eastern states, as opposed to the United States and Israel, it would tip or at least stabilize the balance of power, and it might just keep Trump in check. Furthermore, that would legitimize European efforts while raising questions about U.S. actions.
On top of that, Europe has a direct line to the only country that has real experience dealing with the kind of threat the Gulf states face—Ukraine. And while Trump might want to cut off his nose to spite his face, people in the Middle East are far shrewder. They might realize that Ukraine is not just capable of helping them protect themselves, but also of clearing enemy positions without putting boots on the ground should there be a need for it—albeit for a price.
Something for everyone
While all actors have slightly different aims, at least a version of them can be achieved by arranging their involvement in a slightly different configuration than usual—by assisting the Gulf states.
The United States and Israel would get the assistance they need without having to admit they asked for it. Trump’s daily pronouncements contradict each other by design—which means he can accept help without ever having formally requested it.
Europe would both demonstrate agency and have a very good defence against the supporters of Iran who control part of the political narrative. Countries whose governments question Israel’s right to exist would not be allied with Israel—they would be allied with the Gulf states. So, most of the voters should be, if not happy, then at least not outraged.
And the Middle East would benefit the most from this setup if it helped to solve the crisis.
Potentially.
Ines Burrell is a geopolitical analyst and political risk consultant based in the UK. Born in the Baltics, with a degree in International Relations from the University of Exeter, she writes and gives live commentary on European security and Russia.
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Good piece! I do not agree with every little thing you said, but you made a good argument that survived my internal grumbling quite healthily :)
More like this please, Persuasion!