Eastern Europe Recognises the Power of NATO
Belarus is proof that a “third way” between Russia and the West does not exist.
Did NATO enlargement provoke Russia to aggression? Some foreign policy analysts are still asking about the West’s shared responsibility for the outbreak of war in Ukraine. While the dissection of the geopolitical problem often takes the form of the above question, Russia’s immediate neighbours generally do not share this starting point of analysis. It would not be an exaggeration to say that they are silently driven to irritation by the question, for it seems to tacitly assume that the Russian sphere of influence in East-Central Europe still exists. In the name of “geopolitical realism,” small and medium-sized countries would be deprived of their right to participate in key decisions in international politics. They would be denied the sovereign right to decide whether to join alliances such as NATO.
Irrespective of the disagreements among Western politicians and historians about NATO enlargement, one thing seems certain: the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not on their own in facing the question of what might have happened to their sovereignty had they not applied for membership to supranational structures like the EU or NATO. The answer is simply the history of a country belonging to the same region: Belarus.
In December 1991, the end of the USSR brought independence to this former Soviet republic. The document that finally determined the break-up of the Soviet empire was, incidentally, signed in Belarus at a luxury hunting lodge in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha. The agreement was negotiated by Boris Yeltsin of Russia, Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, and Stanislav Shushkevich, who would later become the first president of Belarus.
The country of almost 10 million people is an extremely interesting case study in European politics, for Belarus has chosen a different path to its neighbouring states. Instead of aspiring to the structures and values of the West, it has chosen to maintain its ties with Moscow while retaining its status as a sovereign state. Today, it can be said that this plan has largely failed.
After President Shushkevich left office, Alexander Lukashenko won the first presidential election in 1994 on a promise of a “return to the USSR.” In a sense, he kept his word. He dismantled the young Belarusian democracy and, instead of aspiring to the EU or NATO, more closely associated himself with Russia. In 1997, the Treaty on the Union of Belarus and the Russian Federation was signed by Lukashenko and Yeltsin, aiming to deepen the relationship between the two states through integration in economic and defense policy. Theoretically, the treaty stated that the countries would retain independence. In practice, it looked just the other way round, with Belarus ever more subordinated to the Russian Federation. Soon, the harsh repression of political opposition was such that then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described Belarus as “the last remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe.” The Belarusian president took this as a compliment. “I am the last and only dictator in Europe,” he said.
Be that as it may, Lukashenko did try to keep his country separate from Russia for as long as possible. The Belarusian president’s initial refusal to recognise the annexation of Crimea was symbolic in this regard. The pressure from the Kremlin on Minsk was self-evident, yet Lukashenko remained silent about the shifting of inter-state borders in Eastern Europe for more than seven years.
That situation changed in 2020. Increasingly unpopular, Lukashenko rigged the presidential election. Mass protests almost removed him from power. Ultimately, brutal repression crushed the opposition. From the point of view of Belarusian sovereignty, the crucial development was the fact that, without Moscow's financial and military support, Lukashenko would not have held on to power at all.
For a long time, Russia worked to further undermine Belarusian independence. Under pressure from Moscow, meetings on deepening “state integration” were held regularly. In the years leading up to the war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin tried to limit the sovereignty of Belarus’ energy policy.
Alexander Lukashenko is aware of the Russian threat. He is sensitive to the possible total loss of independence of Belarus. Against the backdrop of the 2018 gas crisis, he uttered the following: “We are on the frontline. If we don’t survive these years and if we collapse, it means that we will have to become a part of some other state, or they will simply wipe their feet on us.” On some occasions, the president has floundered between the West and Russia—like in 2019, when he earned Putin’s ire after his Defense Ministry began talks with NATO about participating in peacekeeping drills.
The rigged 2020 elections and the weakening of Lukashenko opened the way for further restrictions on the country’s independence, particularly with regards to the military. From February 2022 the country became a de facto base for Russian army operations against Ukraine. It cannot be ruled out that Belarus will eventually be completely absorbed by Russia. For the countries neighbouring Belarus—Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia—the last 30 years of gradual erosion of Minsk’s sovereignty in favour of Moscow is a peculiar memento mori for their statehood.
From the point of view of Kyiv, Warsaw, Vilnius, and Riga, it was therefore the enlargement of NATO and the EU that, in the early part of the 21st century, proved the most important guarantee for the preservation of sovereignty in the region. The consequences for the whole of Europe of the progressive erosion of the sovereignty of East-Central European states are gradually becoming apparent. In May 2023, we heard the news that sent shivers down the spines of EU citizens: “Russia moves ahead with deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.” The obvious targets for the missiles were NATO and EU countries or countries wishing to join these structures—and Belarus once again became the proof that a “third way” between Russia and the West does not exist.
Excerpted from Posttraumatic Sovereignty by Jarosław Kuisz and Karolina Wigura (2023). Available from Suhrkamp (German only).
Jarosław Kuisz, Ph.D., is a political analyst. He is an Associate in Russian and East European Studies (REES) at the Oxford University School for Global and Area Studies. His book The New Politics of Poland: A Case of Post-Traumatic Sovereignty was ranked among the best books of 2024 by Foreign Affairs.
Professor Karolina Wigura is a historian of ideas, sociologist, and Associate Professor at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Warsaw. She is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Liberal Modernity in Berlin and member of the board of the Kultura Liberalna Foundation in Warsaw.
Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.
And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:
 | A guest post by
|
 | A guest post by
|
I appreciate the authors' retort to the question, "Did NATO enlargement provoke Russia to aggression?" As they point out, "it seems to tacitly assume that the Russian sphere of influence in East-Central Europe still exists."
However, we should also value the realist insight, "If you do X, you're liable to get Y. If you want to do X anyway because of the principle of the thing, then go ahead. Just don't feign shock and deny any share of responsibility when you get Y."
There are false assumptions that nonetheless have the power to assert themselves. We ignore them at our peril and at the peril of innocent third parties.