Greedy Eyes On Greenland
If it wants to survive, Europe must take a stand against Trump’s expansionist ambitions.
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The U.S. intervention in Venezuela has prompted a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe, aimed at dissuading the Trump administration from acquiring Greenland, as it has repeatedly threatened to do in recent days. Should that happen, “everything stops,” including NATO, warned Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen.
Given the administration’s disconcerting consistency on the subject, the ringing of alarm bells is fully justified. For arsonists in the administration—such as Stephen Miller, who argued that Greenland should “obviously” become a part of the United States—to abandon the idea, it will take much more than sweet talk and reminders of the usefulness of Denmark as a U.S. ally.
European countries must start thinking about ways they may inflict pain on the United States should it commit an act of aggression against one of their own—and they should start articulating these actions explicitly to the United States, very much in the spirit of Trump’s own doctrine of “Fuck Around And Find Out.”
Alas, for some in Washington, the prospect of NATO’s end is akin to threatening them with a good time. Yet it is hard to imagine U.S. sales of military equipment to European countries would continue unabated if the United States is revealed to be not only an unreliable ally (which it already is) but also a direct threat to the sovereignty of European countries. And good luck to the United States attempting to project power in the Middle East without its bases in Germany, Italy, and Greece.
The United States and Europe also have the deepest trade and investment relationship in the world. The United States holds almost $4 trillion worth of business assets in the EU. European businesses underwrite millions of jobs in the United States. Europeans should signal a willingness to drastically curtail such ties, even at substantial economic cost to themselves. U.S. tech giants have already been playing fast and loose with EU rules governing large platforms; if the United States becomes a threat to European territorial integrity, it is unthinkable that such companies—given the thin wall separating them from political power in Washington—could be allowed to operate in the EU.
A further step would be the sanctions lists. Travel bans and asset freezes would have to be imposed on key administration figures as well as on its financial backers. Currently, Europe welcomes millions of ordinary Americans as tourists every year. Could it afford to do this during a confrontation with the United States? Would it want to?
Even though this scenario sounds extreme, the point of articulating it explicitly is to make it clear that there would be large costs for the United States if the Trump administration pressed ahead with its plans for Greenland. If the risks seem limited—and if Trump continues to consider European leaders as weaklings—he might give his demented project a shot.
The danger rises as Trump becomes weaker domestically. The most compelling reading of the stunt in Venezuela is unrelated to any strategic considerations—as highlighted by the fact that the administration had little in terms of a plan for the day after Maduro’s removal. The operation, however, has been a success in moving the domestic political conversation away from the Epstein files, the creeping stagflation and vulnerabilities presented by the current AI-driven economic growth, and the emerging cracks in the Republican coalition, which have been on full display in recent elections in Virginia and New Jersey. As Axios reported, even congressional Democrats had misgivings about criticizing the president.
If Trump’s position weakens again in the coming months, ever-riskier international stunts might become a way of managing his coalition and avoiding relegation to a permanent lame-duck status. And given the awesome power of the United States, Trump has real cards to play in the international domain. The EU must learn how to stand up for its own interests when threatened.
The idea that, in response to U.S. threats, it is incumbent on Europe to “propose to Trump something that addresses the security concerns related to Greenland,” ideally dispatching Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni and Finnish president Alex Stubb, as some Atlanticists suggest, is indicative of a Stockholm Syndrome-like mentality, which brought Europe into its current predicament in the first place. Like all bullies, Trump responds to force. Alas, Europeans have invariably responded to his antics with appeasement and accommodation.
While obviously cartoonish and frivolous, the U.S. threat to Greenland is in some ways a more acute problem than Russia’s war against Ukraine. One could make the argument, implausible as it is, that Putin’s ambitions stop at Ukraine and that his regime harbors no ill will against EU member states. The United States is, on the other hand, making a direct threat against Denmark. Neutralizing that threat—with a credible commitment to impose painful countermeasures—is a basic, necessary condition for the bloc’s survival as a geopolitical force of any relevance.
None of this is to predict that Greenland’s annexation will materialize or that transatlantic relations must enter a period of deep freeze, akin to excising Russia from the Western economic space. Yet, even if Trump moves on and the current threat passes, Europeans must think about their economic and other vulnerabilities—not only toward China and Russia but also toward the United States. Washington already is an unreliable ally. It has walked away from the cause of helping Ukraine in its war and the prospect of it honoring its Article 5 commitments of mutual defense is slim.
The Trump administration’s recent National Security Strategy sees the EU’s disintegration as a core U.S. interest—not containing and deterring Russia, not forging a deep economic partnership with Europeans to limit China’s role in the global economy, but rather U.S. endorsement of ethnocentric and nationalist forces in European elections. It is a fundamental category error to see this approach as “transactional” and to look for ways of appeasing Trump. This administration’s view of the world is gangster-like and colonialist. Europe’s choice is to either succumb to it or to stand up for its core interests.
Besides dissuading a U.S. annexation of Greenland, Europe must underwrite Ukraine’s victory, build up its own defense-industrial base instead of purchasing U.S. systems, and take bold action on U.S.-supplied algorithmic content in its own public square. It must also abandon the illusion that deep economic, trade, and investment ties are a guarantee of a good and constructive transatlantic relationship. There will be a time to rebuild and repair the damage that is being inflicted on the alliance between Europe and the United States. That time, unfortunately, is not now.
Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC and a contributing editor with American Purpose.
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Alas, too true. Who would have thought that Europe might become the last, best hope of earth?
I think this article makes a few errors.
1) I think it overstates Europe’s ability to inflict pain on the United States, and the relative powers of the two groups. That bias seems to permeate the article, and somewhat undermines its core premise. The idea that US tech companies are flouting European regulations, for instance, and not that EU regulators are extorting American companies as a form of soft protectionism, is one such example of this Brussels-centric view.
2) While the Trump administration’s actions are certainly offensive to say the least, the Danes do not come across particularly well either. Greenland may be an “integral” part of Denmark, but they conceded its right to independence as recently as 2009, despite slow-walking since then, and it is for all intents and purposes a Danish colony. Denmark’s sterilization campaign against the indigenous Inuit population of Greendland (who make up 90% of its inhabitants) was as recent as the 1960s and 1970s. Angry Danes insisting on social media—and through official diplomatic channels—that Denmark is “theirs” would do well to consider how they might feel if China were courting far-flung American territorial possessions with a dubious history and ethnically distinct population, such as American Samoa. While the American military threats are obscene and justify great anger, Danish (and by extension, broader EU) foreign aims are not helped by reminding the world of European colonialism.
3) The main issue is here is to mistake Trump for an ordinary dictator and hence to treat Trump’s America like a semi-rational actor. Neither are good models. Trump is a narcissist who looks up to strongmen and detests whining. Mark Carney has been able to play both attributes to Canada’s advantage, flattering where necessary but playing the tough negotiator when it came time to make a deal. Other leaders, from Xi and Sheinbaum to Milei and a series of British PMs have managed the same. If Europe wants to have successful relations with this degenerate administration, it will need to manage the hardest possible task: dropping the stereotypical European condescension towards Americans—even at that moment when it is most deserved.