But first, some facts. Fidesz didn't win 83% of parliamentary seats. Fidesz won 68% of the parliamentary seats. But, if it *had* won that many seats, it would not be historically unheard of.
Consider these election results from UK history for the majority party:
But first, some facts. Fidesz didn't win 83% of parliamentary seats. Fidesz won 68% of the parliamentary seats. But, if it *had* won that many seats, it would not be historically unheard of.
Consider these election results from UK history for the majority party:
One of the things that makes me upset about this piece - as a political scientist myself - is that any political scientist that is properly trained and qualified to be writing a piece like this must know that majoritarian electoral systems produce these kinds of exaggerated rewards routinely, regardless of partisan or non-partisan gerrymanders. This is a well-known feature of these systems and the election reforms of ca2011 and 2014 basically has transformed the Hungarian electoral system to one far more like a UK style system (majoritarian) than a Dutch style system (highly proportional).
Now, we can absolutely debate the merits of movements along these continuum. But, what we can't say, is that to move in the direction of the UK is a move towards electoral authoritarian institutions.
Now, the reason why this happens, and why it gets worse if you have a fragmented opposition, is that in single-member districts (constituency districts) or 'PR' systems with a low avg. district magnitude (Hungary has both) only a small number of parties CAN get seats. And if the opposition is divided and the government unified, they are advantaged in competing for districts with few available seats.. and very advantaged if they are competing for a single seat - REGARDLESS of how you draw the lines.
But, in this case, the Hungarian rules for drawing district lines is actually quite restraining. Budapest and Counties must have integrity. Districts can't cross country lines or impinge on the capital. 'Gerrrmanders' with long salamander like lines to capture the right voters are a tool not available for Hungarian district-crafters. They can gerrymander still, but in far tighter constraints than you would find in Illinois or New York. Take a look at those state maps overlayed by a couny map. Do the same for Hungary. Illinois and New York are *obviously* just at a glance, more clearly gerrymandered.
So, in light of these *very* basic facts any comparative political science scholar *must* know if they are minimally informed and *not* simply presenting one's political biases as knowledge, there is very little on-its-face clearly anomalous about this hungarian election result or, indeed, the system itself. It is, ultimately, well within democratic norms on virtually every meaningful dimension.
This is particularly true given that Fidesz has - for most Hungarians - objectively governed well the past decade, and particularly in comparison to the prior decade. This isn't a story of a Trumpy leader who is a misgoverning chaos machine obsessed with his golden toilet to busy tweeting from atop it to deliver on his promises to his lower income base. Rather, this is the story of what happens when a populist actually delivers on the goods for their constituency that is more than a majority of the voters.
None of this makes things in Hungary 'a-okay', but it does mean (a) way more evidence is required to satisfy claims of predatory voter choosing gerrymandering, that (b) whatever is found is unlikely to be comparatively substantial, and that worrying signs of slides to autocracy need to be sought elsewhere.
there are places to look. Media is one (though I think overblown). The other is in some complex adminstrative reforms, and a Democratic Party style courtpacking policy that has harmed the constitutional courts independence at a time when the rules of constitutional amendment give the supermajoritarian ruling power almost unlimited control.
Combining such an amendment procedure with and electoral system that is majoritarian, when the opposition is fragmented provides almost unrefuseable opportunities for the power seeking party cartel.
But as you might have already grasped from my rejoinder here... the problems that I can see all look pretty familiar. They are not anomalous either. They are backsliding trends we see ACROSS advanced industrial democracies. On a number of dimensions Hungary isn't even in the lead. So, why the level of fire direct at Orban? Why the lying and exaggerating?
I don't know, but what I must conclude is that there is something other than concern for the truth and democracy at its root.
Very fair question. The answer is: Very easily.
But first, some facts. Fidesz didn't win 83% of parliamentary seats. Fidesz won 68% of the parliamentary seats. But, if it *had* won that many seats, it would not be historically unheard of.
Consider these election results from UK history for the majority party:
1931 - CON V: 61% S: 85%
1935 - CON V: 54% S: 70%
1945 - LAB V: 48% S: 61%
1983 - CON V: 42% S: 61%
1997 - LAB V: 43% S: 62%
2001 - LAB V: 41% S: 63%
Or these from the U.S. House elections:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FPfgMJCWYAUfIxH?format=png&name=small
One of the things that makes me upset about this piece - as a political scientist myself - is that any political scientist that is properly trained and qualified to be writing a piece like this must know that majoritarian electoral systems produce these kinds of exaggerated rewards routinely, regardless of partisan or non-partisan gerrymanders. This is a well-known feature of these systems and the election reforms of ca2011 and 2014 basically has transformed the Hungarian electoral system to one far more like a UK style system (majoritarian) than a Dutch style system (highly proportional).
Now, we can absolutely debate the merits of movements along these continuum. But, what we can't say, is that to move in the direction of the UK is a move towards electoral authoritarian institutions.
Now, the reason why this happens, and why it gets worse if you have a fragmented opposition, is that in single-member districts (constituency districts) or 'PR' systems with a low avg. district magnitude (Hungary has both) only a small number of parties CAN get seats. And if the opposition is divided and the government unified, they are advantaged in competing for districts with few available seats.. and very advantaged if they are competing for a single seat - REGARDLESS of how you draw the lines.
But, in this case, the Hungarian rules for drawing district lines is actually quite restraining. Budapest and Counties must have integrity. Districts can't cross country lines or impinge on the capital. 'Gerrrmanders' with long salamander like lines to capture the right voters are a tool not available for Hungarian district-crafters. They can gerrymander still, but in far tighter constraints than you would find in Illinois or New York. Take a look at those state maps overlayed by a couny map. Do the same for Hungary. Illinois and New York are *obviously* just at a glance, more clearly gerrymandered.
So, in light of these *very* basic facts any comparative political science scholar *must* know if they are minimally informed and *not* simply presenting one's political biases as knowledge, there is very little on-its-face clearly anomalous about this hungarian election result or, indeed, the system itself. It is, ultimately, well within democratic norms on virtually every meaningful dimension.
This is particularly true given that Fidesz has - for most Hungarians - objectively governed well the past decade, and particularly in comparison to the prior decade. This isn't a story of a Trumpy leader who is a misgoverning chaos machine obsessed with his golden toilet to busy tweeting from atop it to deliver on his promises to his lower income base. Rather, this is the story of what happens when a populist actually delivers on the goods for their constituency that is more than a majority of the voters.
None of this makes things in Hungary 'a-okay', but it does mean (a) way more evidence is required to satisfy claims of predatory voter choosing gerrymandering, that (b) whatever is found is unlikely to be comparatively substantial, and that worrying signs of slides to autocracy need to be sought elsewhere.
there are places to look. Media is one (though I think overblown). The other is in some complex adminstrative reforms, and a Democratic Party style courtpacking policy that has harmed the constitutional courts independence at a time when the rules of constitutional amendment give the supermajoritarian ruling power almost unlimited control.
Combining such an amendment procedure with and electoral system that is majoritarian, when the opposition is fragmented provides almost unrefuseable opportunities for the power seeking party cartel.
But as you might have already grasped from my rejoinder here... the problems that I can see all look pretty familiar. They are not anomalous either. They are backsliding trends we see ACROSS advanced industrial democracies. On a number of dimensions Hungary isn't even in the lead. So, why the level of fire direct at Orban? Why the lying and exaggerating?
I don't know, but what I must conclude is that there is something other than concern for the truth and democracy at its root.