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Steve Stoft's avatar

I love Steven Pinker and his defenses of rationality. Seriously. I totally agree: We should be rational. I have a degree in math, the most rational subject.

But reading the opening lines of his new book last night I choked.

“Rationality ought to be the loadstar for everything we think and do. (If you disagree, are your objections rational?)”

Well, yes, my objections are at least as rational as possible when objecting to a claim based on an undefined word -- “loadstar.”

I would like to suggest to Pinker a more rational opening, which I think leads to a much stronger defense of rationality (and would help clean up his current post).

“We should be as rational as it is rational to be, neither more nor less.”

This admits the obvious − that we cannot be totally rational. But it also suggests something quite wonderful. We have an irrational faculty called intuition, which is often even better at getting right answers than rationality.

And because intuition is easier and faster, it is often rational to use it rather than wasting too much time rationally planning the very best direction for escaping the lion we just noticed in the grass.

This is an example Pinker uses in his book's third paragraph but misunderstands. He implies that the caveman’s only alternative to rationality for coping with “the lion in the grass” is to rely on a “suite of biases, blind spots, fallacies, and illusions.”

Intuition is simply off his radar.

John von Neumann, the father of game theory and the most brilliant game theorist bar none, developed a theory that could be used to play poker rationally. Yet he was unable to carry out that rational calculation. Some cowboys were known to be extremely good at poker even without his theory. Yes, they used rationality − and heaps of intuition. Using only pure rationality, they might never have won a single hand.

Interestingly, the folklore of intuition is vast. One famous story is that the arrangement of carbon atoms in benzene (they form a ring) was discovered by the German chemist August Kekulé when he dreamed of a snake biting its tail. When stuck on a complex problem I often study it intensely before I go to bed. Frequently, I wake up with a useful insight in the morning that occurs to me before I even remember I was working on the problem. Intuition!

Now here’s what would clear up Pinker’s post. What he has done is assume three axioms and then use rationality. He finally makes this clear when he says, “When you combine self-interest and sociality with impartiality … you get the core of morality.” By “get” he means you can logically deduce morality from his three axioms: (1) self-interest, (2) sociality and (3) impartiality.

I think he’s right that you can, although it’s a rather limited morality, and to go much further he will likely need more axioms.

What he has done is to mimic math. Mathematicians pick a set of axioms (assumptions) and then prove what things they imply. Science often works the other way round − observing what’s true and figuring out underlying assumptions that predict the observation. But we can’t scientifically observe morality.

My complaint is that Pinker has mystified the process of choosing his axioms. He keeps wanting us to think his assumptions are rational, and he gives subtle “rational” arguments. No, it's easier than that. Axiom (1) and (3) are just assumptions − starting points. And axiom (2) is just something we observe to be true − basically a scientific observation.

So the proper argument for (1) and (3) is, “I like these, and you probably do too, so let’s give them a try.” That’s much simpler than phony rationality. (That’s what mathematicians do.)

And pretending to be rational when you can’t be (e.g. when picking assumptions) leads to irrational statements, like,

“As soon as we start insisting to others, ‘You must not hurt me, ... we cannot also maintain, ‘But I can hurt you.’”

“Maintain” is another non-logical, undefined word, but I’ll guess he means “believe” rather than “proclaim.” In this case, his claim is just wrong. Quite a few people believe “you must not hurt me, but I can hurt you.” They are called sociopaths. And they are the key to understanding much of our politics. I’ll bet you can even think of one (starts with a T).

We can’t be rational all of the time − like when making assumptions or playing poker. But that’s OK. We have very powerful intuitions for the hard problems. Of course, we make lots of mistakes both when trying to be logical and when trying to intuit. But that’s life for us Earthlings. So just keep this in mind.

1. Be rational about when to be rational.

2. Never, ever toss out rationality because you think it’s bad (or white).

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Ted D. Rossier's avatar

You appear to be basing the "rationality of morality" upon the human's relationship with other humans. But what if a person is completely self-sufficient such that they don't need society? One rather unfortunate implication of your argument is that the more independent a person is (i.e., the more power they have), the less moral they need to be to remain rational. In other words, might makes right and in your system the main variable is power, as it is in all systems of human morality that exists apart from God.

Your dismissal of the Eutyphro dilemma is irrelevant. The dilemma itself is false: something is not good merely because God wills it, *nor* does God will it because he is subject to a higher authority of goodness. God commands moral behavior because he *is* the highest authority and goodness or morality is part of his nature and character. It is consistent with who he is, and he cannot act or command in opposition to his nature. We reflect this morality in our own reason because we are made in God's image (whether or not we personally believe it).

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