Remembering September 17, 1939
Remembering September 17, 1939
When ordinary Russians again showed willingness to support foreign conquest.
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September 17 is an important date. For some it marks the beginning of a republic, while for others it spelled the cruel end of one. On that day in 1787 the convention that met at Independence Hall in Philadelphia signed into life the American Constitution—a document that became a beacon of democracy and liberty worldwide. Also on that day in 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Poland, fulfilling its treaty obligations with Nazi Germany, directly contributing to the outbreak of World War II.
For Soviet leader Josef Stalin, helping Hitler defeat Poland meant the division of Central Europe into two camps per the terms of a secret protocol attached to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939. Half of prewar Poland along with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and parts of Finland and Romania were eventually cast into Soviet occupation between 1939 and 1941.
Under the fabricated pretext of “liberating” Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities under Polish rule, Stalin’s invasion of Poland began the culmination of a territorial revisionist policy that aimed to regain political influence and territorial ownership lost after 1914 by rolling back self-perceived dangerous foreign imperial influence—in this case that of the Franco-British (and to a lesser extent American) entente over the little states of the region. When the French asked the USSR to provide a justification for its invasion of Poland, the Soviets responded that they didn’t need to explain to anyone the reason behind their foreign policy. Then, as today, waging war was the Kremlin’s preferred way of conducting foreign policy.
By 1945, thanks to shrewd politics, by which the Soviet Union turned into a “liberator” of the lands gained in partnership with Hitler, as well as a fortuitous turn of military events on the ground, Stalin successfully consolidated his sphere of influence. The USSR rose to be a co-equal with its new enemy the United States, not only over decisions about Europe, but as a check on expanding American interests and influence throughout the world. The satellite states that Stalin created in Central Europe, which strengthened the Soviet empire’s periphery around the Russian core, served two crucial purposes. They became a defensive buffer zone against possible Western aggression—something Stalin believed was always brewing—and a potential offensive springboard from which to attack the West in the name of ideological and territorial expansion—something he and his successors were planning.
Today, the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 is interpreted much differently. The Russian psyche has been taught to view this act as a defensive measure, part of Stalin’s strategic foresight of creating a buffer zone, thereby keeping war away from the Soviet Union for several years. A public opinion poll conducted by the Levada Center in 2017 asked Russians if they had heard about the secret protocol appended to the German-Soviet nonaggression pact. 40 percent admitted that they had heard about it, and when asked if they approved or disapproved of Stalin’s decision to sign the pact, 45 percent fully or somewhat approved. Stalin continues to be admired in Russia, with 70 percent of Russians stating that he played an entirely (18 percent) or mostly (52 percent) positive role in the history of Russia. Since 2009, a state commission against the “falsification of history” has been tasked by Putin with legally censoring any mention of the Soviet Union’s partitioning alliance with Nazi Germany.
Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was launched in the spirit of September 17. It was motivated by the false pretext of “saving” or “liberating” Ukrainians from a regime of Nazi fascists purportedly governing their country. Its goal, among others, was to upend the post-Yalta order, represented by the hegemony of the United States and other Western-oriented states in Central and Eastern Europe after 1991, replacing it with instability, fear and reasserted Russian dominance. Also like September 17, the invasion was described as a defensive measure aimed at checking and pushing back Western influence—the United States and Poland—by turning Belarus and Ukraine into Russia’s critical western buffer.
Losing the much-coveted foothold deep inside Europe that originally stemmed from Stalin collaborating with Nazi Germany after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the self-liberation of Central Europe is something that bothers Vladimir Putin a lot. But he isn’t alone in lamenting the collapse of the USSR. Although the percentage of Russians who regretted the collapse hit a record 75 percent in 2000, almost a generation later the number was still close to 70 percent. In 2018, Russians continued to misunderstand the disintegrating force of nationalism and the will of imperial peripheries to be independent—60 percent believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union could have been avoided.
The follow-up question, then, is how? Given Russia’s imperial history, force appears to be the only answer since, in rejecting the West, Russia has nothing left to offer the world. It can only attempt to subjugate its neighbors by force, as in the case of Poland in 1939. Russians supported Stalin then, and defend his decisions now. Today, they aren’t helpless victims of propaganda cut off from information about the outside world. On the contrary, Russians overwhelmingly support Putin. They are simply cut from the same cloth.
In reinventing the empire, Russia will rely on past experience, like Poland 1939, to subjugate by force people inhabiting lands that once fell within the Soviet sphere. This was always described by the Kremlin as a “self-defense” mechanism. Then, as now, it centered around an anti-fascist struggle. Today, “de-nazifying” Ukraine is equated with a struggle against NATO and the West. While the official historical line emphasizes the Soviet Union’s role in defeating Nazi Germany and downplays actions like the 1939 invasion of Poland, this type of ahistorical perversion is an easy sell in Russia simply because of the fact that Russians see Poland as an enemy, placing it fourth on its list of top enemies, behind the United States, Ukraine, and the UK. This is unlikely to change anytime soon.
Aside from inheriting the problems that stemmed from the USSR’s fall, Putin and Russia became heirs to Soviet thoughts, motives, and actions, exploiting them in a new political game of total, unrestricted war against alleged internal enemies, the West, and the world in order to revise Russia’s imperial geopolitical position. This means suturing former Soviet or tsarist territory back to the Russian core. The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 prompted the need for a land bridge between the peninsula and Russia proper. Experts worry that Putin desires to see the Kaliningrad enclave more directly connected to Russia, foreshadowing a readiness to challenge the territorial integrity of the countries lying in that post-Soviet space, i.e. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Putin knows that Russians will support him because for centuries they have been conditioned to accept the fate of being sent to the front as cannon fodder in the name of the empire.
In May 2023, three in four Russians continued to say they supported the military operation in Ukraine. When asked what their opinion would be if they could go back in time with the benefit of hindsight, 48 percent said they would have still supported the start of identical military action. The overwhelming support for Putin’s war against Ukraine did not wane in 2024 either. Research by NORC at the University of Chicago showed that 94 percent of Russians expressed pride in their identity and 62 percent felt that Russia is being treated unfairly globally.
From “liberating” Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities in 1939 to “denazifying” Ukraine 85 years later, Russians are willing to pay a very steep price to seize territory they see as rightfully theirs. Russia has suffered close to half a million casualties in Ukraine, foreign investment has plummeted, resulting in joblessness, while a sharp decline in the ruble’s value (by approximately 30 to 40 percent compared to its pre-war levels) caused inflation to surge, and living standards to drop. Regardless, Russians support the war in Ukraine.
The key takeaway seems to be that given the choice between peace and prosperity in return for accepting the loss of former imperial peripheries, the “Russian soul” will choose war, poverty, and empire.
Dr. Maciej Olchawa is the author of several books on Ukraine. Between 2022-2024, he was the Kosciuszko Foundation Scholar at Loyola University Chicago.
Dr. Pawel Markiewicz is a historian of 20th-century Central and Eastern Europe and the executive director of the Washington, DC office of the Polish Institute of International Affairs.
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How were these polls taken? why would anyone believe a poll of Russian citizens who might be afraid to criticize their government when they don't know if the poll-taker will keep their responses confidential?