Serbia is Playing Both Sides
Aleksandar Vučić continues to walk a tightrope between east and west.
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How do both Russia and the United States support Serbia’s semi-autocrat?
Amid student-led anti-corruption protests that have shaken Serbia, the country’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, aims to distance the Balkan nation from Russia. Although he remains one of the very few leaders who enjoys support from both Moscow and Washington, as well as from the European Union and China, in the coming days he will likely need to make moves that could impact on Belgrade’s ties with the Kremlin. But will that affect his reign?
Serbian students have been on strike for weeks as part of a larger movement demanding accountability for the tragic incident on November 1, 2024 in the city of Novi Sad, when a massive concrete awning at the railway station collapsed, resulting in the deaths of 15 people. Renovation work on the station began in 2021 as part of a Chinese-led modernization of Serbia’s railway infrastructure. It was completed and publicly introduced by Vučić and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán during the 2022 election campaign.
A significant portion of the Serbian population blames the collapse on what is widely portrayed as endemic corruption. Vučić, however, initially accused the students of launching protests for money, claiming that, as one news site put it, they were being “paid by the West to hold protests in a bid to overthrow his government.”
In reality, Vučić has been firmly backed by the West since he came to power in 2012. With him in charge of Serbia, the United States and the European Union can count on stabilocracy—a regime that includes considerable shortcomings in terms of democratic governance, yet enjoys external legitimacy by offering some supposed stability—in the Balkans.
The West, therefore, has no reason to pay protesters to overthrow Vučić, as his reign does not pose a threat to the United States’ and the European Union’s interests. The anti-Western narrative is directed at his voters, most of whom have strong pro-Russian sentiments. Such rhetoric seems to be coordinated with the Kremlin’s claims about the supposed Western attempts to force a “color revolution” in Serbia.
On December 26, 2024, just days after tens of thousands of people gathered in Belgrade to support the students’ anti-corruption demands, the spokeswoman of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, accused Western countries of putting pressure on the legitimate Serbian authorities, claiming that they are planning to destabilize the Southeastern European nation.
“The attempts of the collective West to inflame the situation in the country, using the techniques of a ‘Maidan-style coup’ are obvious,” she stressed, referring to the expulsion of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from power in 2014.
In the eyes of the average Vučić voter, Zakharova’s statement clearly shows that Moscow supports the Serbian populist leader. She already used the same rhetoric in December 2023, when the Serbian opposition protested parliamentary and municipal elections, accusing Maria Zakharova of orchestrating a fraud. Serbia is, therefore, one of the few places where Russia and the United States—two major geopolitical rivals—do not seem to have any disagreement.
Despite election irregularities, the U.S. Ambassador to Serbia Christopher Hill backed Vučić, blaming the opposition for “violence and vandalism against state institutions.” Over the years he has repeatedly stated that Serbia is “moving in the right direction.” Most recently, just days after Zakharova accused the West of planning to overthrow Vučić, Hill stressed that Serbian-American relations are “moving forward.” He also welcomed Vučić’s Ukraine policy, emphasizing that he was “pleased to see to what degree Belgrade has developed its relationship with Kyiv.”
Indeed, Serbia indirectly supplied Ukraine with €800 million ($828 million) worth of ammunition, while Vučić signed several international declarations condemning Moscow’s actions in the Eastern European nation. By signing the Tirana Declaration—a document that expresses “unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders as of 1991”—in February 2024, Vučić de facto supported the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Russian president Vladimir Putin.
The Kremlin, however, turns a blind eye to Vučić’s moves and to the fact that he is pursuing a pro-Western policy while maintaining pro-Russian and anti-Western rhetoric for his own voters. Amid anti-corruption protests, Serbia’s Chief of General Staff Milan Mojsilović said that Belgrade has cancelled contracts for Russian weapons that have supplied its army since Soviet times, citing Western sanctions on Moscow. At the same time, Vučić is trying to cut Serbia’s relations with Russia’s energy giant Gazprom, the owner of a 56% stake in Serbia’s main oil company, NIS.
Since the United States imposed sanctions on the Gazprom subsidiary in Serbia on January 10, Vučić will be forced to nationalize NIS. On January 13 he said that Washington wants Russia to completely exit NIS. His idea, as a result, is to offer Moscow $700 million to buy out Russia’s stake. On January 4, Vučić met with Hill to discuss this issue, while on January 14 he held talks with the Russian Ambassador to Serbia, Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko, after previously announcing his plans to speak with Putin.
In the coming weeks, it will become clear whether the Kremlin approves of his proposal. But given that Gazprom incurred a loss of $492.5 million in the third quarter of 2024, the company’s officials are likely to demand a higher price for NIS. Politically, Gazprom’s exit from Serbia, as well as Belgrade’s decision to halt military cooperation with Moscow, clearly represents another geostrategic seatback for Putin.
Whether this means that Vučić will no longer be able to count on the Kremlin’s support remains to be seen. Serbia may be de facto on Ukraine’s side, but it has not formally joined anti-Russian sanctions. Such a strategy allows Vučić to continue portraying himself as a “pro-Russian” politician at home, helping him preserve a large number of voters. Putin seems to be using the same techniques in Russia, creating the illusion for his own audience that there is a European country “resisting Western pressure” to impose sanctions on Moscow.
One thing is sure: under the current circumstances, with Vučić firmly backed by all major powers operating in Serbia, student-led anti-corruption protests cannot count on external support. If the Serbs want to get rid of Vučić, they will have to do so on their own. That will be easier said than done.
Nikola Mikovic is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia.
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Serbia still has the problem writer Radoje Domanovic warned about in "The Leader" at the beginning of the 20th century https://domanovic.org/2015/02/07/leader-1/
Students for freedom!