Ukraine Holds More Cards Than You Think
Trump wants to throw the country under the bus—but Ukrainians and Europeans don’t have to let him.
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Ukrainian officials and supporters of Ukraine in Washington are putting on a brave face, but the writing is on the wall. Past the striking visual of Donald Trump’s meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy at St. Peter’s this past weekend, the U.S. administration is seeking to achieve one of two things, interchangeable in the minds of its leaders: one, to impose a shameful deal on Kyiv as part of its rapprochement with Russia, or, two, to walk away from its own peace initiative, cut Ukraine loose, and normalize U.S.-Russia relations anyway.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom according to which Ukrainian leaders must do their utmost to stay on Donald Trump’s good side, there is no reason for them to participate in a game of “heads I win, tails you lose.”
For one, while the United States is a powerful country, and has played a key role in ensuring that Russia does not succeed in Ukraine, the ability of its mercurial president to reshape global events to his liking—without allies who are eager to help—is not unlimited.
Ukraine itself has cards to play. Comparing the ongoing negotiations to Munich in 1938, while well-intentioned, is misleading and ahistorical. Czechoslovakia did not acquiesce to a bad deal after defending itself successfully against Nazi military might for 3 years. Rather, it did so out of fear that a war with Nazi Germany would permanently erase its existence.
Now, a reasonable argument can be made that the Czechs and the Slovaks were in a stronger position than they are usually given credit for to actually stave off a German invasion without allies, and that they were not completely helpless and at mercy of Western powers when faced with Hitler. By contrast, Ukrainians have already tested Russia’s military prowess—and found it wanting. Those who think they can just strong-arm Kyiv into accepting whatever comes out of negotiations between supposed great powers should therefore think twice.
Prolonging the war, at a terrible human cost and without the prospect of a military breakthrough, might be unappealing for the Ukrainians, but that scenario—which has been Ukraine’s lived reality for much of the past decade—needs to be compared against a humiliating deal that will see Ukraine permanently forego its lands, acquiesce to being locked out of Western alliances, and, domestically, will likely set in motion a wave of populist, anti-Western politics fueled by the sense of betrayal.
It is counterproductive for Ukraine to pick public fights with Trump. Yet if the latter wants friendly relations with Russia, let him build them on his own and try to sell them to the American public. Vladimir Putin and Russia remain spectacularly unpopular among Americans—only 13% view Russia very or somewhat favorably. The United States that Kyiv has to deal with today is unlikely to be the same United States that it will have to deal with after the midterms, or after 2028. That should not mean complacency. America’s current erratic character will leave a profound impact on the transatlantic relationship for generations. However, Trump is not a president for life, nor do his policies toward Europe and Russia command broad support among the American public.
At some level, Ukrainians clearly understand that they are not dealing with an all-powerful actor. Whether or not Kyiv ends up reaching a minerals deal with Washington, it is quite obvious that the Ukrainian leadership will not say yes to the King-Leopold-in-the-Congo-style agreement that the Trump administration sought to impose on them some weeks ago—and that is a good thing.
Of course, it is not going to be immaterial if the United States walking away from negotiations puts an end to intelligence sharing and future supplies of U.S. air defenses for Ukraine, and leads to a unilateral normalization of U.S.-Russia relations—including a rollback of sanctions. Yet much of that package is coming anyway, and there is no reason for Kyiv to give it a veneer of legitimacy.
After all, Trump’s own ambition to resume business as usual with Russia, including in areas such as energy, is more likely to encounter political resistance in the United States if it is seen as part of Ukraine’s betrayal—rather than if Ukraine just accepts it. Again, two or four years from now, Ukrainians are likely to be dealing with a different American reality.
Europeans themselves ought to defer to Ukraine in its strategic choices, while providing it with ample financial and military backing to succeed. Seeking to “ease” the country into a deal with Trump is wrong. It is Ukrainians—not the French, Germans, or British—who are the ones fighting Russia. If anything, Europe’s interest is in keeping Ukraine in the fight until something resembling a Russian strategic defeat appears on the horizon, instead of helping it digest a bad deal which will greatly increase the risks facing other Eastern European nations whose lands Putin sees as part of Russia’s historic territory.
Ukraine may in fact wield more influence over Europe’s security than does the United States. America’s power is unmatched, of course, but nobody knows for sure whether the United States, today or in the future, is truly committed to its NATO Article 5 obligations of collective defense. But by fighting Russia today, Ukraine is already helping to keep the war away from NATO territory—behaving as a de facto ally to Poland, Finland, and others facing the threat of the Kremlin. It is Ukraine, not the United States, which can also dispense lessons to Europeans about how to wage a large-scale land war against Russia.
The present moment also makes it obvious that Ukrainians themselves are their own best “security guarantee.” The dirty secret of past NATO expansions—perhaps excluding Finland and Sweden’s accession—is that countries were the most likely to get in at times when they were the least likely to need the alliance’s defense umbrella.
While Ukraine’s accession to NATO is not on the cards at the moment—and it has not been for a while—the sense of loss should be tempered by questions about the future of the alliance as an effective fighting force. U.S. troops are not going to be fighting for Kyiv, but it is also far from certain that they would be fighting for Warsaw or Tallinn if the need arose. Alas, nor are Europeans likely to commit to defending Ukraine anytime soon. The problem is not just the lack of the American nuclear backstop and the inadequacy of British and French nuclear deterrents. The bigger challenge is that the countries that are more forthcoming about confronting Russia have to prioritize building their own domestic defenses.
The good news is that we know for a fact, based on the experience of the past three years, that even a relatively small and poor country such as Ukraine—never mind the top-shelf militaries of Poland or Finland—can stop Russia in its tracks, with what has been modest U.S. and international support. That might not dissuade Donald Trump from trying to engage with Russia as if it were a peer power, equal to the United States. Yet it should be enough to keep Ukraine and Europe from participating in the fool’s errand.
Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC.
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I appreciated reading this perspective on Ukraine's situation and diplomatic choices. Thanks!