Ukraine’s Impossible Dilemma
Zelenskyy has made the concessions he can, but that may not be enough.
Given the sheer number of summits, talks, and bilateral negotiations held between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia since the start of Trump’s time in office, one would be forgiven for getting a dash of déjà vu around the latest talks between Ukraine’s Zelenskyy and Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff in Berlin. The issues at play are still essentially the same ones as back in February—security guarantees for Ukraine and territorial concessions to Russia.
But this time is different, and Ukraine is in more trouble than it has been in at any time since Trump’s return to office. Ukraine has already indicated that it is willing to make significant concessions in its negotiating stance. Its few allies in the Trump administration have been sidelined, and Europe is in no position to pick up the slack from ebbing U.S. support. Ironically, Ukraine’s greatest friend at the moment is—in a sense—Vladimir Putin, whose intransigence stands in the way of a deal favorable to Russia and risks alienating Trump. But with Trump’s patience running thin, Ukraine may very soon find itself forced to accept a deal it does not want.
As always, the deck is stacked against Zelenskyy. Trump and his envoys want a quick end to the war above all else, treating critical issues like territorial control and the security architecture of post-war Eastern Europe like pesky details standing in the way of Trump’s much-coveted “ninth” peace deal (on top of the eight he already claims to have overseen in various global conflicts). Zelenskyy has been doing everything in his power to meet the U.S. president halfway, but this time it may well not be enough. Trump seems to have decided that the quickest way to end the war is to force Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s terms.
Trump has been drifting toward this conclusion for some time now, and Russia’s latest rejection of Trump’s peace proposal earlier this month has apparently only added fuel to the fire. Yuri Ushakov, one of Russia’s top negotiators, has said that any Ukrainian or European suggestions for a peace proposal would be met with “sharp objections,” while Russia’s ambassador to the UK claimed that the only thing Ukraine should be negotiating on is its “surrender.” The Trump administration has clearly internalized this mindset, and during the Berlin talks it reportedly insisted that Ukraine would have to withdraw from the parts of Donetsk Oblast it currently controls in order for a peace deal to be possible—a goal Russia has been pursuing since the start of its invasion.
In response to Trump’s demands, Zelenskyy has agreed to hold elections in Ukraine, and, to sweeten the deal, he has also shockingly agreed to give up his country’s NATO aspirations—a massive shift in Ukrainian policy. But even though such strategies have successfully allowed Zelenskyy to make Russia look like the spoiler in Trump’s eyes in the past, this time they will achieve little besides convincing Trump that Zelenskyy may indeed be pliable enough for the United States and Russia to ram through whatever further concessions they desire.
Zelenskyy has several options at his disposal, but none of them are good. As always, he can try to lean on Europe to support him diplomatically vis-à-vis Trump, to fund Ukraine’s defense, and to provide security guarantees against Russia in the near term and after an eventual ceasefire.
This is seemingly the path he has taken in the wake of the Berlin talks—German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has flattered Trump, put out a statement emphasizing Ukraine’s post-war security needs, and gathered European leaders from Poland to the UK to lend support to Ukraine.
But it’s no secret that Europe’s pull is largely illusory—ever since the start of the current stage of negotiations, EU leaders have been unable to have any meaningful impact on the proposals Trump has offered the Russians. Putin has made serious efforts to depict the Europeans as being “on the side of war,” and it seems the Trump administration has taken the bait—the U.S. president increasingly sees the Europeans as adversaries, as the latest National Security Strategy makes clear. In talks following the Berlin negotiations, the Europeans have unveiled their proposal for security guarantees for Ukraine that include cooperation with the United States and a European-led “multinational force” operating inside Ukraine, and while this is encouraging for Zelenskyy, it is far from clear that the United States will commit to the proposal. Russia has balked at the presence of any NATO member forces in Ukraine after the war, and there is little reason to think Trump’s team would press Putin on this point.
Unfortunately for Europe and Ukraine, all such peace plans necessarily require American buy-in. Despite advances in its defense industry and its cohesiveness on the diplomatic front against the United States, Europe still clearly cannot match U.S. support for Ukraine, either militarily or on the intelligence front. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte conceded this month that Europe has no Plan B outside of relying on America for aid to Ukraine, even though the Trump administration has indicated it will withdraw much of its support by 2027.
Perhaps the only bright spot Ukraine can count on at this stage is its own armed forces, which have been taking every opportunity available to them to demonstrate that Russia’s slow march across Ukraine’s east is far from unstoppable. After Russia publicly claimed that it had captured the town of Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast, Ukrainian forces swiftly eliminated Russian soldiers in the area, clearing the town enough for Zelenskyy himself to be able to visit and film a triumphant video not far from the frontlines. There was certainly good reason for his trip—a great deal of Trump’s pro-Russia tilt is based on the perception of an inexorable Russian advance. While it’s unclear whether the Ukrainians will be able to replicate their victory at Kupyansk along other, more dug-in parts of the frontline, the battle could demonstrate to Trump that Russia is far from invincible—if he’s paying attention, that is.
The sad truth for Zelenskyy, though, is that all of this may be too little, too late. Sooner or later, Zelenskyy will have to make the choice he predicted in a somber video at the end of November—“either the loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner.” If he chooses the former, he will see his country carved up by an enemy and former ally. If he chooses the latter, he will see the United States abandon him in favor of a new economic and political thaw with Russia, leaving Ukraine and Europe at Russia’s mercy.
Michal Kranz is a Warsaw-based journalist who covers Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He has reported from the ground during the war in Ukraine, covered politics and society in Lebanon, and regularly reports on regional developments from Poland.
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let's "deconstruct" this a little better. Ukrainian NATO aspirations were always a no no This is no great concession by Zelensky. They can aspire all they want, they will not be formally accepted, that's why you have all these negotiations over other security guarantees which may almost reach Article 5 status. The actual big concessions, will of course be over land. Russia currently controls 19% of Ukraine and that can only grow, no matter how haltingly and no matter how many lives the Russians lose. Zelensky claims he cannot give up Crimea, that's of course nonsense, Crimea has never been Ukrainian and only became a part of Ukraine because Krushchev gifted it to Ukrainian SSR without ever considering the possibility of the eventual breakup of the Soviet Union. Crimea has never been Ukrainian. It's actually Tartar, but of course Stalin ethnically cleansed them out during WW2, and it's now Russified and of course, the home of the Black Sea Fleet, they're never getting Crimea back (and we all know if Crimea was the territorial cost to end the war, the Ukrainians couldn't end it fast enough LOL) So the actual big question(s) will of course be the Donbas and Luzhansk. It's my understanding that some of the eastern areas of those provinces were also :"incoroporated" into the Ukrainian SSR without ever considering the possibility of Ukrainian independence. Much of that land was also Russian speaking and completely Russified. Ultimately, the Ukrainians will have to give some of that up. Of course, now the Russians also control parts of Zaporozhyie, and this territory constitutes the ancient Ukrainian heartland .. back to the times of Chmielnicki. If Zelensky can get Zaporozhyie back, open up a little more space around Odessa and keep control of what they have now in Donbas and Luzhansk, while getting into EU with solid European and US security guarantees in case of future Russian aggression, if I were Zelensky I'd take that in a minute... and I suspect most Ukrainians also would.