Why Iran's Woman Life Freedom Revolution Failed
The movement has been hampered by suppression... and internal strife.
The Iranian people’s uprising against the killing of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, by so-called morality police was unprecedented in its scale and intensity—the largest civic demonstration by the Iranian people since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Iranians of every lifestyle and political background from throughout the country and diaspora came out onto the streets for sustained protests which aimed unmistakably at wholesale overthrow of the regime.
The West’s luminaries, often wary of Iranian dissent, awakened from a decades-old slumber: Intellectuals but also celebrities, musicians, business leaders, and ordinary citizens across the world voiced their support for protestors braving bullets on the streets of Iranian cities.
In images of women risking all to burn the headscarves that suffocated their true selves, in their soulful dancing in the streets, in the raising of their uncovered heads toward the open, star-filled sky, those following the events saw the universal yearning for freedom. It was a reminder of the sort of explosive, cathartic outpouring that had brought down communism—all the more so for coming at a time when America and the democratic world writ large struggle with their own civilizational confidence and purpose.
I have worked for decades to promote democratic knowledge and civic capacity in Iran, support Iranian activists, and lay the groundwork for political transition in Iran. The Woman Life Freedom movement was the culmination of our efforts, morally and practically. The Iranian people had a striking singleness of purpose in their call for overthrowing the regime. They were willing to sacrifice for their freedom, had each other’s support and the world’s solidarity. The movement was egalitarian, secular, humanist, and peaceful.
So why did the Woman Life Freedom revolution fail?
The most obvious reason is that the regime has proven adept at sustaining fear through widespread brutality—executing protestors, torturing even children, conducting its campaign of sexual violence against the detained. That brutality is paired with a sophisticated, well-funded cyber army dedicated to defaming and dividing the opposition. Those efforts have kept Iran’s democracy movement from achieving united leadership.
The West is not excused from blame either. The Biden administration has consistently pursued a policy of appeasement of the regime. That comes through in a “soft approach to sanctions enforcement,” which has by some measures allowed the Islamic Republic to export “near-record” amounts of oil. It comes through in a general sense of U.S. avoidance of the Middle East, not least of which is the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. The United States’ lack of commitment leads to wavering by allies as well, with the European Union unwilling to follow the recommendation of the European Parliament and declare the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organization.
Majid Tavakoli, Iran’s leading liberal intellectual (currently serving a six-year sentence), has concluded that the high level of repression inhibits organizing for democratic change from inside the country and that forces for meaningful reform can emerge only from abroad. “I think it is not possible to organize inside Iran,” he said just before starting his prison sentence.
That sensibility is shared by many Iranians, with swelling demand during the Woman Life Freedom protests for a “solidarity group” to coalesce abroad and present a unified alternative to the international community.
And, in fact, during the high days of the movement, a solidarity group advanced farther and faster than many expected. A breakthrough appeared to occur at a Georgetown University conference in February, 2023, with the assemblage of the “Georgetown Coalition.” Amidst an array of high-profile figures—a Nobel Peace Prize winner, film actors, a soccer star, etc.—the most recognizable was Reza Pahlavi, the son of the Shah ousted in 1979.
Pahlavi has consistently delivered a message of democratic pluralism, universal human rights, tolerance, and national reconciliation. His presence at Georgetown helped to lend an air of high purpose to the emerging coalition. Soon afterwards, Pahlavi and the activist Masih Alinejad were invited to take part in the Munich Security Conference—a significant gesture towards international recognition of the group as a “government-in-exile.”
Yet weaknesses in Pahlavi’s leadership soon became apparent. Despite, or perhaps because of, his mild-mannered disposition, Pahlavi has chosen advisors who, unlike him, grew up in the Islamic Republic and are now pushing an Iranian nationalism that publicly calls for retributive violence, summary executions, the purging of leftists, vilification of human rights defenders, and antagonism towards free media outlets. His most visible associates spend most of their time peddling distrust and attacking other opposition leaders on social media rather than organizing real action against the regime. The tragedy is that this sort of harmful division is occurring exactly at the moment when a united front is most needed.
The reverses of the past year bring us to a set of conundrums. The Iranian people have—with remarkable courage and unity—signaled their loathing for the corruption and brutality of the regime. But that brutality has been effective in preventing their movement from becoming a fully-fledged revolution. Emphasis shifts to the diaspora, but that work is stymied by disunity, disorganization, and the leadership shortcomings of Pahlavi.
Still, even with these setbacks, the heart of Woman Life Freedom beats in smaller acts of civil disobedience. Renewed mass mobilization against the regime is inevitable given the Iranian people’s newfound consciousness of ubiquitous dissent, not to mention a pervasively corrupt economy. By the time that renewed mass mobilization occurs, the opposition must have learned from its earlier mistakes. The Islamic Republic is too powerful and too cunning an opponent to be defeated by an opposition at war with itself.
Mariam Memarsadeghi is founder and director of the Cyrus Forum for Iran's Future, co-founder and previous co-director of Tavaana: E-Learning Institute for Iranian Civil Society, and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
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Not sure why Persuasion needed to platform this petty exercise in score settling among diaspora activists.
Why does not English-language Western news source look into the ethnic/class composition of the protestors and regime-supporters. Is it an accident that most protesters killed were from Baluchistan, Kurdistan and Tehran?