Fascinating effort to make sense of a topsy-turvy political environment. Not sure I could manage the same feat. When I was serving as an American diplomat in Peru focused on political affairs during Alan Garcia's second term, this system was in the process of being born, even if Garcia made it to the end of his term. Somehow, utterly dysfunctional politics managed not to undermine the country's underlying macroeconomic stability and solid growth. One got the sense that the political dysfunction was disconnected from critical economic decision-making, as you suggest. Now that I think about it, I remember one prominent APRA pol telling me that Garcia found himself increasingly frustrated by a system that managed to defy his every directive; when the president said "jump," nothing happened. Maybe that’s why his second term didn’t turn out so bad. Nicely done.
Is there any serious popular desire in Peru to alter the constitution in such a way as to substantially lessen Congress's power to defenestrate the president, and, if there is such a desire, how hard is it to meaningfully amend that constitution? Another question that, like it or not, I do admit came to my mind on reading this analysis, is that is there a serious chance that at some point, if no changes in the system are made, and Congress does again attempt to remove a president, that president would be able to martial sufficient military and military-adjacent (say law enforcement, intelligence, and/or paramilitary) resources necessary to effect an autocoup?
Fascinating effort to make sense of a topsy-turvy political environment. Not sure I could manage the same feat. When I was serving as an American diplomat in Peru focused on political affairs during Alan Garcia's second term, this system was in the process of being born, even if Garcia made it to the end of his term. Somehow, utterly dysfunctional politics managed not to undermine the country's underlying macroeconomic stability and solid growth. One got the sense that the political dysfunction was disconnected from critical economic decision-making, as you suggest. Now that I think about it, I remember one prominent APRA pol telling me that Garcia found himself increasingly frustrated by a system that managed to defy his every directive; when the president said "jump," nothing happened. Maybe that’s why his second term didn’t turn out so bad. Nicely done.
It sounds like it will fall into a Mexican style kleptocracy in time as the roots of organized crime spread.
Is there any serious popular desire in Peru to alter the constitution in such a way as to substantially lessen Congress's power to defenestrate the president, and, if there is such a desire, how hard is it to meaningfully amend that constitution? Another question that, like it or not, I do admit came to my mind on reading this analysis, is that is there a serious chance that at some point, if no changes in the system are made, and Congress does again attempt to remove a president, that president would be able to martial sufficient military and military-adjacent (say law enforcement, intelligence, and/or paramilitary) resources necessary to effect an autocoup?