The World Simply Does Not Trust America
In much the same way that Americans no longer trust themselves.
Back in 1995, I published my second book, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. In it I argued that trust is among the most precious of social qualities, because it is the basis for human cooperation. In the economy, trust is like a lubricant that facilitates the workings of firms, transactions, and markets. In politics it is the basis for what is called “social capital”—the ability of citizens to cohere in groups and organizations to seek common ends and participate actively in democratic politics.
Societies differ greatly in overall levels of trust. In the 1990s, Harvard’s Robert Putnam wrote a classic study of Italy which contrasted the country’s high-trust north with its distrustful south. Northern Italy was full of civic associations, sports clubs, newspapers, and other organizations that gave texture to public life. The south, by contrast, was characterized by what an earlier social scientist, Edward Banfield, labeled “amoral familism”: a society in which you trust primarily members of your immediate family and have a wary attitude towards outsiders who are, for the most part, out to get you. The only large organizations in the south were the Catholic Church and, of course, the Mafia. The latter was a direct product of distrust: if you were a businessman, you couldn’t count on the state to protect your property rights because of a weak rule of law; if someone cheated you, you hired a mafioso to break their legs.
In Trust, I characterized the United States as a “high-trust” society. This view has a long history. When the French observer Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830s and traveled across much of the settled part of the country, he noted that America had a high density of civic associations, from bible studies to clubs to mutual aid societies, and that Americans found it relatively easy to work together with strangers in the face of challenges. This, he felt, stood in sharp contrast to his native France, where, he said, you couldn’t find ten Frenchmen who were ready to work together in a common endeavor. In France, there was little of the spontaneous sociability or social capital that he found in the United States. This view of high-trust America was supported, in the mid-20th century, by survey data that showed Americans trusting other Americans to a higher degree than people in France and many other countries.
If I were to re-write Trust today, I would not characterize the United States as a high-trust society. Even as that book was being published in the 1990s, political polarization had started to spread, and Americans began to sort themselves according to their political preferences. That polarization has only increased in the interval between then and now. It has turned into what political scientists label “affective polarization,” in which partisans don’t just disagree on issues, but also come to believe that their opponents are deeply malevolent and dishonest. Social capital still exists between members of the different political tribes, but distrust is rampant across the society as a whole. We don’t accept a common set of facts on issues like vaccine safety or election integrity, and we live by a series of conspiracy theories that inform us that things are not what they seem.
Trust and social capital are built on a foundation of moral virtue. We come to trust people who are honest and reliable, who keep commitments and are willing to offer support even when it isn’t of immediate benefit to themselves. Trust takes time to build through a process of repeated interaction: if we see another person fulfilling their promises and reciprocating favors, we tend to do the same for them, creating a virtuous circle. But a trust relationship that has built up over time can be broken in an instant, if one of the parties betrays that trust and takes advantage of the other player. Just as trust builds on itself, distrust can become self-reinforcing: if we are betrayed, we are tempted to seek revenge against the betrayer.
Trust is also critical in international relations. We come to trust other countries based on their observed behavior, just as we do with individuals. There is no global enforcer of rules or a sovereign to make countries behave. The use of force is constrained only by the expectation that it will be met with a counter-force, in an environment where credibility is the coin of the realm.
That is what makes me extremely worried about the present global situation, and fearful of where our world order is heading.
It is hard to imagine that the current war with Iran and the crisis over the Strait of Hormuz does not represent a fundamental rupture in the North Atlantic security structure. NATO is an alliance built on trust: its deterrent value rests on the belief that NATO members will come to one another’s aid if a member is attacked. This is what happened after 9/11, when a number of alliance members did come to America’s defense in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO is not an all-purpose commitment to support a treaty partner who has undertaken an offensive war against a third party. Trump is accusing alliance members of betraying the United States by not collaborating with it to re-open the Strait—but no one ever signed up to wage offensive war.
The truth of the matter is that the United States has never been as isolated as it is today. Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO, has made some supportive noises in the current crisis, but that was done out of cynical calculation. No sane European leader can think that support for the United States today will be reciprocated by a Trumpist United States down the road. And while American actions have greatly benefited rivals like Russia and China, they can hardly delude themselves that the United States will reliably serve their interests in the future.
Donald Trump has claimed that the United States has never been as respected as it has been under his presidency. Of the very many untrue things he has said in his career, this is among the most absurd. There has never been a time when the United States was more distrusted, by both traditional friends and by rivals, as at the present. A successful dealmaker needs to generate a minimal amount of trust that he will uphold his end of the bargain. But reciprocity is a virtue that Trump has never understood or practiced.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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Trump has destroyed trust like no other political figure in the history of this country. For what? To what end? The self-sabotage for no reason is unprecedented. Assuming we turn a corner and return to sanity, will we be able to recover?
The core problem is that U.S. institutions lost the trust of about half of the U.S. electorate - and they deserved that loss of trust. How could the American people elect as president a candidate who had just been found guilty of multiple felonies? The answer is that it was fairly easy, because a plurality concluded - very reasonably - that the criminal proceedings were a politicized sham. Which was itself easy to do after the debacle of the government's COVID response and other similar examples. I agree with FF on the crucial importance of trust. That's why it is so important for our institutions to undergo a cleansing to regain the trust of the American public. They have a lot of work to do.