There is a deeper irony here in relation to Fukuyama’s own idea of “the end of history.”
If liberal democracies respond to AI accelerationism by adopting increasingly authoritarian modes of control—model pre-approval, trusted-partner regimes, security-state discretion, centralized licensing, and emergency executive decisions—then are we not facing another kind of “end of history,” but in the opposite direction from the one Fukuyama once described?
The danger is not only that authoritarian states will use Power-RSI to control AI-RSI. It is also that democracies, in order to defend themselves against AI acceleration, may internalize the logic of authoritarian governance. Trump’s chaotic intervention against Anthropic may be crude and political, but it points to a broader structural problem: once AI capabilities become national-security threats, democratic procedures may appear too slow, too public, and too constrained.
The real question, then, is whether liberal democracies can develop a form of democratic acceleration capacity: fast enough to govern AI-RSI, but accountable enough not to become Power-RSI themselves.
A very strange ending for history: not liberal democracy as the final form of government, but a prisoner’s dilemma-RSI among regimes trying not to be out-accelerated.
Probably best if all sensitive data is executed, stored, and archived using physical paper. Time to buy the next big meme stock... International Paper (NYSE: IP)! 📄🚀
For all you day traders out there: I strongly recommend dumping all your GameStop stock and going all in on IP. Just sayin'. 😄
I'd like to recommend an important book that I believe contains an impressive analysis of American democracy's current crossroads: “BREAKING THE TWO-PARTY DOOM LOOP, The Case for Multiparty Democracy in America” by Lee Drutman. It offers four very intelligent proposals for course adjustments and corrective action.
Timely prescription or too little diagnosis done too late?
Having just read Power and Progress by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (prompted by my reading of Empire of AI by Karen Hao just before), our core political problem came into view with almost frightening clarity: How will we appropriately regulate what some observers are calling the most consequential technology in human history, on behalf of the public interest, at a time when our government has been almost completely captured by private interests. These private interests increasingly include the very tech bro oligarchs who are making pivotal decisions with respect to AI et al by fait accompli, presumably motivated (if we take the Power and Progress thesis seriously) by their own narrow self-interests whatever magnanimous rhetoric they use in public. Not only that, if you take people like Peter Thiel at his word, these oligarchic interests are explicitly pursuing their own interests at the expense of everyone else, plotting to dismantle democracy as a matter of public record.
Please someone contradict my possibly alarmist analysis with good evidence, but I don't see the Trump administration stepping into the breach with any sound and sane AI regulatory framework to protect the general public. Call me jaded and cynical, but I just don't. The puzzle pieces in place suggest the exact opposite.
There is a deeper irony here in relation to Fukuyama’s own idea of “the end of history.”
If liberal democracies respond to AI accelerationism by adopting increasingly authoritarian modes of control—model pre-approval, trusted-partner regimes, security-state discretion, centralized licensing, and emergency executive decisions—then are we not facing another kind of “end of history,” but in the opposite direction from the one Fukuyama once described?
The danger is not only that authoritarian states will use Power-RSI to control AI-RSI. It is also that democracies, in order to defend themselves against AI acceleration, may internalize the logic of authoritarian governance. Trump’s chaotic intervention against Anthropic may be crude and political, but it points to a broader structural problem: once AI capabilities become national-security threats, democratic procedures may appear too slow, too public, and too constrained.
The real question, then, is whether liberal democracies can develop a form of democratic acceleration capacity: fast enough to govern AI-RSI, but accountable enough not to become Power-RSI themselves.
A very strange ending for history: not liberal democracy as the final form of government, but a prisoner’s dilemma-RSI among regimes trying not to be out-accelerated.
Volume 2: The End of the End of History. :)
The genie seems out of the box already. https://cybersecuritynews.com/anthropics-claude-oceanus-v1-p/ A more aggressive/proactive/comprehensive/imaginative rather than passive/reactive/narrow/prosaic AI policy stance is urgently needed.
Probably best if all sensitive data is executed, stored, and archived using physical paper. Time to buy the next big meme stock... International Paper (NYSE: IP)! 📄🚀
For all you day traders out there: I strongly recommend dumping all your GameStop stock and going all in on IP. Just sayin'. 😄
(TheForegoingStatementIsProvidedSolelyForSatiricalAndEntertainmentPurposesAndShallNotBeConstruedAsInvestmentAdviceASolicitationToPurchaseOrSellAnySecurityOrARecommendationRegardingAnyInvestmentStrategyTheAuthorExpresslyDisclaimsAnyFiduciaryDutyToTheReaderHoldsNoBeneficialOwnershipInterestDirectOrIndirectInInternationalPaperHasNoPresentIntentionToAcquireSuchAnInterestAndMakesNoRepresentationOrWarrantyExpressOrImpliedRegardingTheFuturePerformanceOfPaperPaperRelatedAssetsOrTheContinuedViabilityOfPaperAsADataStorageMediumPastPerformanceOfCelluloseIsNotIndicativeOfFutureResults.)
I'd like to recommend an important book that I believe contains an impressive analysis of American democracy's current crossroads: “BREAKING THE TWO-PARTY DOOM LOOP, The Case for Multiparty Democracy in America” by Lee Drutman. It offers four very intelligent proposals for course adjustments and corrective action.
Timely prescription or too little diagnosis done too late?
Having just read Power and Progress by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (prompted by my reading of Empire of AI by Karen Hao just before), our core political problem came into view with almost frightening clarity: How will we appropriately regulate what some observers are calling the most consequential technology in human history, on behalf of the public interest, at a time when our government has been almost completely captured by private interests. These private interests increasingly include the very tech bro oligarchs who are making pivotal decisions with respect to AI et al by fait accompli, presumably motivated (if we take the Power and Progress thesis seriously) by their own narrow self-interests whatever magnanimous rhetoric they use in public. Not only that, if you take people like Peter Thiel at his word, these oligarchic interests are explicitly pursuing their own interests at the expense of everyone else, plotting to dismantle democracy as a matter of public record.
Please someone contradict my possibly alarmist analysis with good evidence, but I don't see the Trump administration stepping into the breach with any sound and sane AI regulatory framework to protect the general public. Call me jaded and cynical, but I just don't. The puzzle pieces in place suggest the exact opposite.