The difference between policy makers (mostly elected) and policy implementers (mostly employees and appointees) is so important and so overlooked. Thank you for bringing it into better focus. While I am skeptical of Donald Trump (a policy driver), I am hopeful that the folks at DOGE (neither elected nor employees, nor even lawful government appointees interestingly) do understand the fundamental role of implementation better than most in government.
But with respect to the first fine point about procurement, I think one important and central problem gets left out, which is most prominent in the software side of things. I've worked both in large government and a large non-profit, and in each case they faced a nearly identical problem that massive and long-lasting organizations have when it comes to software: legacy systems. I would estimate that about 90% of the insoluble problems in both contexts came down to the desire to upgrade to something more sensible, butting up against the reality of legacy systems that had been used for decades, and which were both incompatible with a newer system, and unchangeable because of long reliance and integration with other systems in the organization.
I don't know if this will fall into the DOGE portfolio, but I would expect that the tech industry participants will also be familiar with this problem in implementation that touches on much of what the entire administration will have to face: Trump's desire to do the right thing vs. the facts on the ground.
Very interesting take on the problems with our government procurement of weapon systems, and just systems in general. The example of Ukraine’s approach with respect to drones and drone software elegantly highlights the downsides of the US’ archaic approach.
The difference between policy makers (mostly elected) and policy implementers (mostly employees and appointees) is so important and so overlooked. Thank you for bringing it into better focus. While I am skeptical of Donald Trump (a policy driver), I am hopeful that the folks at DOGE (neither elected nor employees, nor even lawful government appointees interestingly) do understand the fundamental role of implementation better than most in government.
But with respect to the first fine point about procurement, I think one important and central problem gets left out, which is most prominent in the software side of things. I've worked both in large government and a large non-profit, and in each case they faced a nearly identical problem that massive and long-lasting organizations have when it comes to software: legacy systems. I would estimate that about 90% of the insoluble problems in both contexts came down to the desire to upgrade to something more sensible, butting up against the reality of legacy systems that had been used for decades, and which were both incompatible with a newer system, and unchangeable because of long reliance and integration with other systems in the organization.
I don't know if this will fall into the DOGE portfolio, but I would expect that the tech industry participants will also be familiar with this problem in implementation that touches on much of what the entire administration will have to face: Trump's desire to do the right thing vs. the facts on the ground.
Very interesting take on the problems with our government procurement of weapon systems, and just systems in general. The example of Ukraine’s approach with respect to drones and drone software elegantly highlights the downsides of the US’ archaic approach.