Is China Capable of Attacking Taiwan?
Xi’s intentions are clear, but China’s military is plagued with corruption.
In his New Year address on December 31st, Chinese President Xi Jinping laid out his plans for 2024. He spoke in the painfully repetitive patois that’s so natural to Communist Party members. “We will steadfastly advance Chinese modernization, fully and faithfully apply the new development philosophy on all fronts, speed up building the new development paradigm, promote high-quality development, and both pursue development and safeguard security,” he intoned. And then, moving abruptly from the vague into the terrifyingly specific, he said: “China surely will be reunified.”
If he is to be taken at his word, of course, this would imply a potential invasion of Taiwan, leading to the very real possibility of a global conflict. The island nation’s presidential election in January may have seemed a likely catalyst for this ambition, especially as Beijing’s least favourite candidate emerged victorious (Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party).
The signs were certainly ominous. As the election approached, Google Cloud’s cyber threat intelligence firm Mandiant reported a “substantial volume of espionage operations” carried out by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwanese technology and critical infrastructure. Warplanes filled the Strait, PLA tugboats passed within three nautical miles of Taiwan’s southern coast, and Chinese high-altitude balloons flew directly over the island (the latter a new development).
But following Lai’s victory, things have been surprisingly quiet. In stark contrast to the aftermath of Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwanese visit back in summer 2022, when the PLA conducted live-fire artillery shooting and ballistic missile test firings close to the island, Beijing has launched no belligerent response. While it’s possible that Xi is simply waiting until May 20th when the new president assumes office, it would seem most likely that China’s huge internal challenges have stayed his hand.
Many commentators, myself included, have warned of the PLA’s military prowess. It turns out that appearances may have been deceptive. Recent U.S. intelligence revealed that a quantity of China’s formidable-looking nuclear missiles are actually filled with water. Doubtless the money for fuel had disappeared into pockets, based on widespread assumptions within the military that China will never really go to war and that no serious missile inspection would ever be carried out. An ex-officer, who fled to the United States in 2016, described the common practice whereby army personnel would take home chunks of missile fuel for use with their evening meals—it was particularly useful for keeping hotpots on constant boil. Comical details like these provide a rare glimpse of the PLA from the inside. They show a military culture thoroughly rotten and hollowed out by graft.
Perhaps, in its current state, the PLA is incapable of anything so ambitious as conquest. Xi’s recent purging of fifteen senior military figures may well have been a frantic response to the discovery of this chronic corruption. While Beijing has given an official reason for the removals, they come amidst reports of widespread graft investigations. If that is the case, then a rehaul of the PLA will now be underway, and Xi’s plan for invasion may well be significantly delayed.
The danger has not passed. During my private conversations with Chinese mainlanders over the years, I was told more than once—by individuals who claimed high-ranking Party connections—that the Taiwanese issue was Xi’s real reason for abolishing term limits in 2018. Historian Niall Ferguson heard the same thing from one of the president’s economic advisers. “Reunification” is of immense personal importance to Xi: it is the goal around which he intends to build his legacy. It’s an ambition that requires time and preparation, and the traditional ten-year tenure as President of the PRC and General Secretary of the CCP was simply insufficient. So he extended it. Xi’s mind was made up long ago: he will invade as soon as he can be sure of success.
But others in the Party leadership may not agree. Recall, for instance, PLA general Liu Yazhou, who found himself swept up in Xi’s “anti-corruption” drive two years ago. He received a suspended death sentence. Under Communist Party rule, those charged with crimes related to corruption are often being targeted for something else, and Liu was known to have written several times on the foolhardiness of attempting to take Taiwan by force. This was the real reason for his downfall: the public utterance of a position that directly opposed the president’s most cherished dream. Liu’s opinion may be a common one.
And then there is the Chinese public. According to a recent poll, a majority of mainlanders support the invasion of Taiwan, but how serious is such support? American expatriate Blake Stone-Banks recalls the mood back in August 2022, as Nancy Pelosi’s plane circled the island in cautious preparation for arrival at Taipei—an event that many believed could trigger war. He sat at a business dinner in eastern China, where nobody at the table could tear their eyes from their phone. Stone-Banks also observed a young couple on a date at a nearby table: as the evening progressed, they neither spoke to one another nor looked at each other. Romance was a distant memory. “The only sound in the restaurant was the bleep of the radar on their smartphones,” wrote Stone-Banks. The horrified, dry-lipped tension in that room does not suggest a public fired up by warlust.
China certainly has its hyper-nationalist extremists: mini-Xis who hunger for imperial expansion. I’ve had the personal misfortune to make their acquaintance. But a percentage of those who support the invasion may have been demonstrating a superficial performative rage.
Finally, there is the woeful state of the Chinese economy. This development could push China in two very different directions. On the one hand, Beijing is weaker now than at any point in years: it needs friends and foreign direct investment and it needs to find a way out of its economic challenges rather than bullishly beating the war drum. On the other hand, states facing decline have historically become more confrontational. Xi’s instincts incline him toward confrontation, but he lacks Vladimir Putin’s cavalier rashness. He will not make the move until he feels that the odds are decidedly in his favour. China’s corrupt military and the president’s own economy-tanking policies have set him back, buying time for both Taiwan and the world.
Aaron Sarin is a freelance writer living in Sheffield, currently focusing on China and the CCP.
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The example of the Soviet Union and Russia makes this clear. When a govt. has little transparency, and officials at every level have a strong incentive to hide screw-ups rather than expose and correct them, its military can be incredibly feeble. Note Russia's spectacularly inept Ukraine invasion, for example.
Moreover -- In the West, we may have forgotten China's disastrous invasion of Vietnam in 1979, but I'm sure the Chinese haven't. The Chinese force vastly outnumbered the Vietnamese but got their asses spanked and retreated quickly. Chinese casualties -- over 60,000 -- were almost as numerous as Vietnam's entire defensive force. Vietnam had a fraction of the PLA casualties.
China would be looking at a similar scenario with Taiwan -- a well-trained and patriotic-as-hell force fighting to defend their home turf, against a relatively unmotivated, corrupt PRC army.
The energy lens is also important to consider when thinking through the difference between Russia and China's invasion decisions. Russia's status as an energy exporter gave it the insulation it needed to launch its invasion at a high point in the oil price cycle. China's status as an energy importer cripples its optionality due to the Malacca Dilemma.
Even if Xi fixes the near-term corruption and economic concerns, he'll have to deal with revamped focus and collaboration from the US and its Quad allies over the medium-term and cratering Chinese demographics over the long-term. Given these mounting issues, he may simply decide that there's no time like the present. If not, we may have China's poor energy footing to thank.