In 2012 in Concord, CA a group of us formed a nonprofit society called Neto Community Network, based on our common belief in and commitment to social and economic equity. Members have been from quite a range of social, economic, ethnic, religions backgrounds. We celebrate people who build our community in a range of ways and work together on community projects. We have seen what such a group of people connected by a common vision and civic beliefs can achieve.
When I began to grow interested in political theory, back in the 1980s, the field was dominated by the liberal-communitarian debate. But it eventually died down precisely because, rightly understood, this was always a family quarrel within liberalism, a matter of where to place the emphasis, rather than a battle between competing and incompatible positions. I would make a somewhat stronger claim for there being a larger truth accessible to reason than Fukuyama quite asserts in the middle of the essay (where he retreats into a few too many rhetorical questions). But he's absolutely correct that we will not achieve agreement on that truth, and if we were all compelled to adopt a single viewpoint on "the good," I fear it would not be the one desired by conservative postliberals. (Or by a regular old conservative liberal, like me.) Toleration remains the alternative to conflict and oppression.
These important issues translate directly into current debates over governance of social media, and the case for middleware that lets users control their own social media feeds (which Fukuyama has advocated for). I have argued that a major failure of social media is that the mediating role of communities has been neglected, and that middleware can enable not only individuals, but their communities, which can use middleware services to regain their mediating influence online. One small but notable step in this direction is the Blacksky feed for the Black community on Bluesky.
Humans are social animals; they do not need to be encouraged to be members of a group and to be mentally defined by group interactions, it’s part of their biological make-up. The real issue is how much authority groups have over their members and how much space they leave to individual flourishing. That is not to say that individuals should always be prioritised, but it is important to realise that individual rights are always fragile and under threat and will naturally disappear if they are not vigorously defended.
Twice now, posted before concluding. Dr. Fukuyama, would appreciate hearing your thoughts on MacIntyre and his relevance to our current moment. Thank you.
As it happens, currently reading Alasdair Macintyre’s “After Virtue.” He strongly rejects the communitarian label. “Something I have never been.” MacIntyre insists that his critique of liberalism does not come from that place, but from a virtue ethics in the Aristotelian sense.
In 2012 in Concord, CA a group of us formed a nonprofit society called Neto Community Network, based on our common belief in and commitment to social and economic equity. Members have been from quite a range of social, economic, ethnic, religions backgrounds. We celebrate people who build our community in a range of ways and work together on community projects. We have seen what such a group of people connected by a common vision and civic beliefs can achieve.
When I began to grow interested in political theory, back in the 1980s, the field was dominated by the liberal-communitarian debate. But it eventually died down precisely because, rightly understood, this was always a family quarrel within liberalism, a matter of where to place the emphasis, rather than a battle between competing and incompatible positions. I would make a somewhat stronger claim for there being a larger truth accessible to reason than Fukuyama quite asserts in the middle of the essay (where he retreats into a few too many rhetorical questions). But he's absolutely correct that we will not achieve agreement on that truth, and if we were all compelled to adopt a single viewpoint on "the good," I fear it would not be the one desired by conservative postliberals. (Or by a regular old conservative liberal, like me.) Toleration remains the alternative to conflict and oppression.
These important issues translate directly into current debates over governance of social media, and the case for middleware that lets users control their own social media feeds (which Fukuyama has advocated for). I have argued that a major failure of social media is that the mediating role of communities has been neglected, and that middleware can enable not only individuals, but their communities, which can use middleware services to regain their mediating influence online. One small but notable step in this direction is the Blacksky feed for the Black community on Bluesky.
I explain the case for a greater community role in social media in some depth in this article (https://www.techpolicy.press/three-pillars-of-human-discourse-and-how-social-media-middleware-can-support-all-three/), and a more basic introduction to middleware is in this Persuasion guest post with Renee DiResta (https://www.persuasion.community/p/how-to-reclaim-social-media-from).
Humans are social animals; they do not need to be encouraged to be members of a group and to be mentally defined by group interactions, it’s part of their biological make-up. The real issue is how much authority groups have over their members and how much space they leave to individual flourishing. That is not to say that individuals should always be prioritised, but it is important to realise that individual rights are always fragile and under threat and will naturally disappear if they are not vigorously defended.
Twice now, posted before concluding. Dr. Fukuyama, would appreciate hearing your thoughts on MacIntyre and his relevance to our current moment. Thank you.
Intended to conclude my
As it happens, currently reading Alasdair Macintyre’s “After Virtue.” He strongly rejects the communitarian label. “Something I have never been.” MacIntyre insists that his critique of liberalism does not come from that place, but from a virtue ethics in the Aristotelian sense.