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I haven’t written for a while because I’ve been in Deep Springs. I returned after a week of being in a remote place far from the news… to see that we are now entering the second month of war with Iran.
It’s a conceit of foreign policy intellectuals to try to infer from statements and events a consistent doctrine underlying an administration’s activities. It should be clear by now that there is no such thing as a Trump doctrine. The administration itself tried to articulate such a doctrine last November when it went through the ritual of producing a National Security Strategy for the second Trump term.
It’s clear today that that strategy document bears no relationship to actual administration foreign policy. The NSS was notable for focusing U.S. strategy on the Western Hemisphere, and downgrading the importance of Europe. It mentions the Middle East only to say that former administrations’ focus on that region was no longer necessary because America had become a net energy exporter. It only mentions Iran twice—the first celebrating the fact that President Trump had negotiated “peace” between Tehran and Israel, and the second noting that Iran’s nuclear capabilities had been “greatly weakened” by the U.S. strike last summer. It nowhere discusses Iran’s nuclear program as a threat to the United States. The NSS does mention the Strait of Hormuz in the following terms:
America will always have core interests in ensuring that Gulf energy supplies do not fall into the hands of an outright enemy, that the Strait of Hormuz remain open, that the Red Sea remain navigable, that the region not be an incubator or exporter of terror against American interests or the American homeland, and that Israel remain secure.
The National Security Strategy document of course doesn’t suggest that the United States could itself trigger closure of the Strait by launching an attack, together with Israel, on Iran.
To the contrary, the opening pages of the NSS spend time talking about how the United States needs to narrow its definition of core interests. It argues, “A strategy must evaluate, sort, and prioritize. Not every country, region, issue, or cause—however worthy—can be the focus of American strategy.” It goes on to criticize earlier administrations whose strategies have been “laundry lists of wishes or desired end states,” lists that “have not clearly defined what we want but instead stated vague platitudes.” It states further that predecessors “have often misjudged what we should want.”
All of this makes sense in the abstract, but has nothing to do with what the Trump administration subsequently did. Iran does not now, and is not likely in the future, to present a direct threat to the United States. It does arguably threaten Israel, but regarding Israel’s security as vital to that of the United States is to engage in the same kind of mission inflation that the NSS criticizes.
The truth of the matter is that the United States’ behavior can best be explained not in terms of a set of principles or hierarchy of priorities, but by the personal interests and preoccupations of the man who happens to be president today. Trump’s head is full of resentments, anger, anecdotes, made-up facts, things he heard on Fox News, and outright lies that he has convinced himself are true.
It would appear that he began his second term favoring the kind of foreign policy restraint that the NSS advocates: he initially cautioned Bibi Netanyahu against striking Iran last summer. But the Israeli prime minister went ahead and attacked Iran regardless, opening up an opportunity for a one-and-done operation that Trump couldn’t resist. This was followed in early January by the snatching of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, in which Trump got very lucky. The difficult operation was successful, and Venezuela’s new leader proved compliant. This seems to have convinced Trump that he had an incredible military instrument at hand, and that he could not only use it at low cost, but would be applauded for doing so.
After Venezuela he was asked by an interviewer whether there were any limits to his actions internationally, and he replied that the only thing that could stop him was “my morality.” Netanyahu appears to have convinced him that Iran would be another Venezuela, and that the regime would collapse quickly after the first few blows. Trump had by that time developed great confidence in his own foreign policy instincts; when asked recently when the war would end, he said he would “feel it in my bones.”
Foreign policy doctrines are not simply of academic interest; they are meant to give guidance to and coordinate the activities of the institutions running the country: the State Department, uniformed military, and intelligence community. The National Security Council is meant to vet different views and present options, as well as warnings about future pitfalls, to the chief decision-maker.
At the present moment, none of these institutions are functioning properly. They are headed by sycophants like Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of National Intelligence, whose main motive is to stay on Trump’s good side. Trump relies on emissaries like Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law Jared Kushner, neither of whom have the standing or knowledge to advise wisely, or clownish bullies like Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who has psychological problems of his own.
The members of Congress, journalists, and foreign leaders asking the administration what its goals are will never get an answer. Those goals are basically whatever Trump believes will best advance his political standing at home, as well as actions that will enrich himself and his family. At one moment, he is demanding regime change and “unconditional surrender”; the next moment, he explains that the Iranian regime has already been changed; indeed, that the Iranians have asked him to run their country for them.
It’s not a good thing when the world’s most powerful country is guided not by clear ideas, but by the personal needs of a single leader. There is no such thing as a Trump Doctrine, and consequently, no current basis for any kind of world order.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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Come on, Francis, we all know that DJT, using his studied intellect, military/history/strategy knowledge, insights into human nature, superior intuition and empathy for the downtrodden is playing 5 dimensional chess with his fellow strongmen around the globe. What could wrong?
We need to remind ourselves every once in a while how far down the dark, dank well of Donald Trump's mind we are. When he first ran for president, everything about his life warned of undisciplined behavior and ignorance cloaked in phony self-confidence ("I trust my gut"). It warned of a stunted character that never dared emerge from the nursery. But to get those warnings, you had to be paying attention to all the available evidence. Too many people paid attention only to The Apprentice.